Testimony: House Committee on Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
“U.S.-Bolivia Relations: Looking Ahead”

March 3, 2009

To view the official transcript for AIN Director Kathryn Ledebur's testimony, follow this link: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/47827.pdf. 

 To watch a complete webcast of the hearing via Real Player, follow this link: http://international.edgeboss.net/real/international/WH03032009.smi.

I am pleased and honored to testify today about U.S.-Bolivian relations.  Researching and reporting on the effects of U.S. foreign policy in Bolivia for nearly 20 years, my organization, the Andean Information Network (AIN), maintains a special focus on drug policy and related human rights concerns.  AIN informs U.S. Congressional offices and advocates, as well as Bolivian and U.S. government officials.  It is essential to generate informed policy debates in order to strengthen democratic institutions, creating openings for positive, productive U.S.-Bolivian bilateral relations. AIN’s long term goal is to promote significant changes in U.S. anti-drug policy in the Andean countries in order to address the economic, social, political, and cultural needs of the region.¹

Bolivia's Vice Minister for Housing, Ramiro Rivera, had been on the job only two weeks last March when his office was occupied by 100 angry members of the Ponchos Rojos (Red Ponchos), a militant Aymara peasant group. Three weeks later, wheelbarrow porters from the Abastos market in Santa Cruz staged a similar protest. Both groups were demanding that the MAS (Movement Towards Socialism) government, headed by indigenous president Evo Morales, make good on its promise to deliver low-cost housing to their constituencies.

As befits a self-proclaimed "government of the social movements," the MAS has articulated a strong commitment to a progressive, non-market vision of social housing, epitomized by the slogan: "Vivienda Digna Para Vivir Bien: Evo Cumple! (Decent Housing for a Good Life: Evo Delivers!)." Meeting with our visiting group of US housing and neighborhood activists last summer, Rivera traced the social housing concept back to the ayllu, the traditional socio-political organization in Bolivia's rural indigenous communities, where every family's right to the land is protected. "We don't believe in making a market commodity out of Pachamama (Mother Earth)," he told us.

Yet, the reality is more complex. During our visit, we gained perspective on the challenges and contradictions facing the MAS government as it seeks to implement a progressive social housing agenda within the constraints of a mixed economy, a politically divided society, and a state bureaucracy undermined by 20 years of neoliberal restructuring.

As predicted, Bolivian voters ratified the new constitutional draft in the national referendum held on January 25, 2009.  Exit polls project that the winning margin will be approximately 62 percent. (1) This referendum also set the limit for private land holdings at 5,000 hectares, winning over the other option of 10,000 hectares by an unconfirmed margin of 79 percent. (2) The National Electoral Court continues to tabulate official votes, and final results should be available within several days. [Please refer to the Electoral Court website (in Spanish) for frequently updated official tabulations at http://www.cne.org.bo/.]  Although this approval represents a significant achievement for the MAS government, it also marks the beginning of a necessarily long legislative process, perhaps involving more than 100 laws to enact the constitutional reforms.

There were no significant incidents of violence or protest reported on Election Day. Regional voting percentages also followed familiar patterns, with lower approval levels in the lowland departments.  Generally, rural results are slower to register, which suggest that “Yes” votes could be higher.

The waning days of the Bush administration saw the breakdown of U.S.-Bolivian relations.  The Obama administration and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales should now seize the moment to repair the bilateral relationship, to the benefit of both countries.

In September 2008, Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador, Philip Goldberg, stating that he had violated national sovereignty by interfering in Bolivian political affairs.  The Bush administration denied any improper conduct and immediately expelled the Bolivian ambassador, Gustavo Guzman.  Evidently as a reprisal for Ambassador Goldberg’s expulsion, the administration then declared (without basis) (1) that Morales’ government had “failed demonstrably” to honor its international drug control obligations and suspended Bolivia from eligibility for benefits under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).  Accusing members of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of engaging in espionage and political interference, President Morales then expelled the DEA from Bolivia.

The Bolivian government has repeatedly promised the indigenous rural poor adequate access to land since 1953. Hope that this promise would be fulfilled swept Evo Morales to electoral victory in 2005, and his administration has moved forward with a serious agrarian reform agenda that other governments have lacked.  While the reform process has encountered resistance from large landholders, the Morales administration has shown a willingness to make compromises on relevant constitutional issues and follow established legal processes. It is urgent that the United States support the land reform underway in Bolivia by asking large landholders to engage in legal processes, rather than violent opposition. The U.S. should provide aid to the Bolivian government for economic development in indigenous and small farmer communities.

The new Bolivian constitutional draft to be voted upon in the January 25 referendum incorporates an important reform: the separation of church and state. It also broadens provisions for religious freedom, specifically including indigenous religious practices. Although these stipulations seem rational and necessary to citizens of countries who employ these precepts, within Bolivia it is a symbolic and historic change.  In response, opposition groups on the right argue that some of the articles are too vague and leave the door open for religious reforms they oppose, especially in the areas of personal rights and education. In contrast, women’s and other progressive groups had hoped that the new constitution would go further to lay the foundation for more liberal legislation.

 On January 25, 2009 Bolivians will vote to accept or reject a draft constitution promoted by the MAS government, resulting from the conflict-ridden Constitutional Assembly and subsequent multiparty negotiations.  The extensive 100-page, awkwardly-worded document has provoked a myriad of mixed reactions in the diverse nation. Opposition groups have voiced stiff criticism of the proposal, although ironically their congressional representatives ratified it.  On the other hand, some social movements and progressive groups argue that MAS permitted too many concessions in the document to make it sufficiently reformist. Some of these critiques have proven valid and constructive, and others inaccurate and politically motivated. 

On December 14th, police reportedly armed with tear gas and rubber pellets and rock-throwing protestors clashed near the duty-free zone in Patacamaya, between La Paz and Oruro.  One man died, apparently from a bullet wound in the back of his neck. Although the Bolivian press stated that either a rubber pellet or bullet caused the death, television footage shows an entry wound with an approximately one-inch diameter and the characteristics of a bullet wound. Both protestors and police sustained injuries. Protestors reported another death, although this has not been confirmed, and the local hospital reported he had been treated for the “impact of a metal projectile” ¹ and discharged.

 On September 16, 2008, the Bush administration announced its determination that Bolivia had “failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months” to adhere to its “obligations under international counternarcotics agreements.” ¹  Ten days later, the Administration announced its intent to make Bolivia ineligible for benefits under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), asserting that “Bolivia’s demonstrable failure to cooperate in counternarcotics efforts over the past 12 months indicates that Bolivia is not meeting important criteria” to qualify for the tariff preferences. ²

The political arena in Bolivia last week was largely dominated by stilted dialogue between national and lowland departmental governments. Although negotiations face significant impediments, commissions formed to address specific points of friction, such as autonomy, represent an improvement over previous, largely symbolic efforts. However, continuing dialogue has been postponed until October 5.

The Washington Office on Latin America and the Institute for Policy Studies
 are pleased to invite you to a discussion 

The Bolivia Crisis for Beginners 
 
featuring

Kathryn Ledebur

Director, Andean Information Network (AIN)
Cochabamba, Bolivia

 
Link to the video:  http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-6645407603142203537&hl=en